Routes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy

We are entering the era of ubiquitous genetic information for research, clinical care, and personal curiosity. Sharing these datasets is vital for rapid progress in understanding the genetic basis of human diseases. However, one growing concern is the ability to protect the genetic privacy of the data originators. Here, we technically map threats to genetic privacy and discuss potential mitigation strategies for privacy-preserving dissemination of genetic data.Comment: Draft for comment

Candida parapsilosis Characterization in an Outbreak Setting

Candida parapsilosis is an important non-albicans species which infects hospitalized patients. No studies have correlated outbreak infections of C. parapsilosis with multiple virulence factors. We used DNA fingerprinting to determine genetic variability among isolates from a C. parapsilosis outbreak and from our clinical database. We compared phenotypic markers of pathogenesis, including adherence, biofilm formation, and protein secretion (secretory aspartic protease [SAP] and phospholipase). Adherence was measured as colony counts on silicone elastomer disks immersed in agar. Biofilms formed on disks were quantified by dry weight. SAP expression was measured by hydrolysis of bovine albumin; a colorimetric assay was used to quantitate phospholipase. DNA fingerprinting indicated that the outbreak isolates were clonal and genetically distinct from our database. Biofilm expression by the outbreak clone was greater than that of sporadic isolates (p < 0.0005). Adherence and protein secretion did not correlate with strain pathogenicity. These results suggest that biofilm production plays a role in C. parapsilosis outbreaks

A Protocol for the Secure Linking of Registries for HPV Surveillance

In order to monitor the effectiveness of HPV vaccination in Canada the linkage of multiple data registries may be required. These registries may not always be managed by the same organization and, furthermore, privacy legislation or practices may restrict any data linkages of records that can actually be done among registries. The objective of this study was to develop a secure protocol for linking data from different registries and to allow on-going monitoring of HPV vaccine effectiveness.A secure linking protocol, using commutative hash functions and secure multi-party computation techniques was developed. This protocol allows for the exact matching of records among registries and the computation of statistics on the linked data while meeting five practical requirements to ensure patient confidentiality and privacy. The statistics considered were: odds ratio and its confidence interval, chi-square test, and relative risk and its confidence interval. Additional statistics on contingency tables, such as other measures of association, can be added using the same principles presented. The computation time performance of this protocol was evaluated.The protocol has acceptable computation time and scales linearly with the size of the data set and the size of the contingency table. The worse case computation time for up to 100,000 patients returned by each query and a 16 cell contingency table is less than 4 hours for basic statistics, and the best case is under 3 hours.A computationally practical protocol for the secure linking of data from multiple registries has been demonstrated in the context of HPV vaccine initiative impact assessment. The basic protocol can be generalized to the surveillance of other conditions, diseases, or vaccination programs

Secure and scalable deduplication of horizontally partitioned health data for privacy-preserving distributed statistical computation

Background Techniques have been developed to compute statistics on distributed datasets without revealing private information except the statistical results. However, duplicate records in a distributed dataset may lead to incorrect statistical results. Therefore, to increase the accuracy of the statistical analysis of a distributed dataset, secure deduplication is an important preprocessing step. Methods We designed a secure protocol for the deduplication of horizontally partitioned datasets with deterministic record linkage algorithms. We provided a formal security analysis of the protocol in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. The protocol was implemented and deployed across three microbiology laboratories located in Norway, and we ran experiments on the datasets in which the number of records for each laboratory varied. Experiments were also performed on simulated microbiology datasets and data custodians connected through a local area network. Results The security analysis demonstrated that the protocol protects the privacy of individuals and data custodians under a semi-honest adversarial model. More precisely, the protocol remains secure with the collusion of up to N − 2 corrupt data custodians. The total runtime for the protocol scales linearly with the addition of data custodians and records. One million simulated records distributed across 20 data custodians were deduplicated within 45 s. The experimental results showed that the protocol is more efficient and scalable than previous protocols for the same problem. Conclusions The proposed deduplication protocol is efficient and scalable for practical uses while protecting the privacy of patients and data custodians

Private genome analysis through homomorphic encryption

Background: The rapid development of genome sequencing technology allows researchers to access large genome datasets. However, outsourcing the data processing o the cloud poses high risks for personal privacy. The aim of this paper is to give a practical solution for this problem using homomorphic encryption. In our approach, all the computations can be performed in an untrusted cloud without requiring the decryption key or any interaction with the data owner, which preserves the privacy of genome data. Methods: We present evaluation algorithms for secure computation of the minor allele frequencies and chi(2) statistic in a genome-wide association studies setting. We also describe how to privately compute the Hamming distance and approximate Edit distance between encrypted DNA sequences. Finally, we compare performance details of using two practical homomorphic encryption schemes -the BGV scheme by Gentry, Halevi and Smart and the YASHE scheme by Bos, Lauter, Loftus and Naehrig. Results: The approach with the YASHE scheme analyzes data from 400 people within about 2 seconds and picks a variant associated with disease from 311 spots. For another task, using the BGV scheme, it took about 65 seconds to securely compute the approximate Edit distance for DNA sequences of size 5K and figure out the differences between them. Conclusions: The performance numbers for BGV are better than YASHE when homomorphically evaluating deep circuits (like the Hamming distance algorithm or approximate Edit distance algorithm). On the other hand, it is more efficient to use the YASHE scheme for a low-degree computation, such as minor allele frequencies or chi(2) test statistic in a case-control study